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1 Introduction 
The economic world has known the developing countries – from the production point of view 
– mainly as a source of cheap labour. Producers all over the world, according to the thesis of 
rational behaviour, seeking the opportunities of minimizing production costs saw their 
unutilized potential. That is why emerging markets, such as China or India, passed for good 
locations where to reallocate the production. 
Those emerging markets truly kept to their names and have successfully emerged. Not only are 
they coming up with new products and services that are cheaper than what their western 
competitors can offer, but they are also becoming leaders in development and innovation. 
Let us1 introduce the world situation with a quote from an article by Adrian Wooldrige in 
(The Economist, 2010): “The United Nations World Investment Report calculates that there 
are now around 21,500 multinationals based in the emerging world. The best of these, such as 
India’s Bharat Forge in forging, China’s BYD in batteries and Brazil’s Embraer in jet aircraft, 
are as good as anybody in the world. The number of companies from Brazil, India, China or 
Russia on the Financial Times 500 list2 more than quadrupled in 2006-08, from 15 to 62. 
Brazilian top 20 multinationals more than doubled their foreign assets in a single year, 2006.” 
Especially China’s rapid growth stands out even among its Asian neighbours during the late 
20th century – called Asian tigers. Based on China’s economic growth and worldwide 
recognition many wonder if this phenomenon will continue and whether this emerging 
country can truly become the world leader. This thesis sets ahead of itself the task of exploring 
such questions. We will focus especially on the fields of Chinese R&D, education and their 
specific labour force endowment. 
1 According to the common practice in academic literature, the author refers to herself by ‘we’. 
 
2 FT Global 500 is an annual report providing a snapshot of the world’s largest companies ranked by market 
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To better understand the whole context of China’s rise, in Section 2, we will briefly 
summarize the Chinese development in 20th century and cover its most important milestones. 
In Section 3, we will discuss more current features of Chinese economy and the influence of 
different growth factors. Prime focus, in Section 4, will be quantitative analysis of China’s 
significant growth factors. In Section 5, we will represent the results and provide conclusion. 
 
2 The Rise of China 
At the beginning of 20th century, China struggled with natural disasters, civil unrest, imperial 
decline and foreign invasion. Levels of income and consumption were remarkably low, and life 
expectancy was 36 years. 
The years of pre-World War II registered only a mild growth, which helped to shape two 
growth epicentres – the Yangzi Delta area around Shanghai and the north-eastern provinces 
mediating Japanese capital and technology. It is interesting to point out that China's share of 
world trade and ratio of foreign trade to GDP before the collapse of international trade caused 
by the Great Depression were not retrieved for over sixty years (Lardy, 1994; Brandt & 
Rawski, 2008). 
 
2.1 The days of Chairman Mao 
Following years, marked by war against Japanese invaders and later by civil feud between 
Communist and Kuomintang (translated as the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces, left newly 
established the People’s Republic of China (October 1949) with economy ravaged by costly 
war and inflation. New political order and macroeconomic policies were quickly installed and 
massive social reconstruction and ‘modernization’ of China begun. 
Our survey based on data from Penn World Table database covering 1953-1976, a period 
roughly concurrent with the hardest communism era in China, shows that China recorded an 
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under central planning outperformed other populous developing nations, such as Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Egypt and Mexico, often by considerable margins (Morawetz, 1978; Brandt & 
Rawski, 2008). 
Chinese nation welcomed new order, modelled after Soviet experience based on state 
ownership and central control system, since it brought longing stability, curbed inflation and 
brought economic revival with 10% annual growth rate. With a Soviet help, they also 
managed to modernize industry and bring new technologies. On the other hand, China had to 
cope with stagnating productivity and inefficiencies due to central planning policy, which 
among others emphasised quantity rather than quality, neglected innovations and services. 
With this chosen path, China has also concluded itself from the rest of the world. For 
example, according to the U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian, the events of 
1949 causing China to fell under communism, “have led the United States to suspend 
diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China for decades”. Furthermore, such 
international isolation hindered Chinese economy and kept it below its potential. 
Under plan system in to 1950s, China introduced better healthcare program which helped to 
lower infant mortality and increase life expectancy from 42.2 (45.6) years in 1950 to 66.4 
(69.4) years in 1982 for males (females) (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). Census data also confirmed 
a spread of education. The proportion of people aged 16-65 without complete primary 
education reduced from 74% to 40% between 1952 and 1978. However, one of the biggest 
problems, which had not been resolved till at least the 1970s, was a food scarcity. 
The situation in the villages was even harder than for the city dwellers. It was necessary to 
limit migration to the cities, due to considerable differences in income and chances for better 
education, housing and pensions. Hence, the regime instituted controls over the distribution 
of urban housing, food grains etc. and revived the hukou system of household registration 
(sometimes called huji system – the law in People's Republic of China requires a household 
registration record). 
An important milestone for the People’s Republic of China was a death of Mao Zedong in 
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to low-income countries China had performed well, China’s position among its Asian brothers 
– Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong – was weak. 
 
2.2 Key reforms to success 
When economy operates well below its potential and is left with neglected opportunities to 
expand the production frontier, even a limited reform that at least partially encourages 
marketing, competition, mobility, price flexibility and innovation, could accelerate growth. 
Chronically malnourished labour force, which partly stands behind the underperforming 
economy, if properly encouraged, could release the desired additional energy. Recent work 
(Brandt & Rawski, 2008) states that partial market revival and an opening of at least minor 
opportunities for international trade and investments are necessary as well. China’s experience, 
in contrast with Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, showed that such simple initiatives 
can stimulate growth without actually significantly changing political structure and trade 
flows. 
Collective farming was replaced by household cultivation. Subsequently, farmers gained extra 
motivation as they were allowed to claim the gains from their effort, rather than receive a small 
share of collective production, which contributed to raising productivity. Under these 
conditions, official purchase prices, particularly for grain, were increasing. Hence, farmers were 
given additional rewards from the extra effort. Subsequently, farm output increased, even 
though, the reformed agriculture sector embodied free market less than in early 1950s. Despite 
all of the distortions caused by government control, the reforms in the form of fitting 
incentives were able to give rural economy the right push. 
Reforms quickly outreached the farm sector. What followed afterwards were urban reforms 
focused on performance of state-owned industry. These reforms had only limited impact on 
improving the performance of state-owned enterprises, however, the contributed to the 
upswing of rural industry and urban collective enterprises. All of that was achieved by opening 
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Another relevant reform step was a creation of dual price system based on splitting transactions 
into the plan and market components. In practice, after satisfying plan requirements, 
producers could distribute residual production at flexible prices. Hence, they were motivated 
to ‘grow out of plan’ (Naughton, 1995). This reform breathed economic life into businesses 
and households without a need for full liberalization of prices or privatization. It also helped to 
improve market allocation without endangering the importance of plan sector and causing a 
political turmoil. 
Expanded price flexibility also supported the transfer of capital, labour, commodities, which 
have been hindered by the hukou system under the planned system. Entrepreneurs were given 
profit opportunities, and rural migrants could pursue new chances of employment first in 
nearby towns, later in distant cities. Also, long neglected tertiary sector was reviving. These 
market-oriented price reforms were the right stimulus for accelerated growth. 
The late 1970s showed also need for a reform approach to international trade and investment. 
China established special economic zones in the South – in the Guangdong and Pujian 
provinces. The important fact is that these zones attracted entrepreneurs especially from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, centres for small-scale manufacturing of labour-intensive exports. Such 
supply of entrepreneurial force turned these zones into a driving force of national growth and 
created a connection to world markets (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). 
Low-cost Chinese labour and overseas market knowledge and capabilities created a new 
prospect of export opportunities, which they, as a result, embraced towards economic 
globalization and industrial upgrading. The emergence of foreign joint ventures brought 
Chinese workers in contact with new technical standards and engineering processes needed to 
become competitive on the global market, which further enhanced introduction of others 
reforms – such as public advertisements for recruiting employees (introduced in 1980s) or an 
equipment leasing (legally founded in 1990s). 
The number of enterprises in China increased from 377,000 in 1980 to almost 8 million in 
1996; according to the 2004 economic census, manufacturing firms accounted for 1.33 
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1999; Economic Census, 2004). China’s economy was revived by market competition, 
marked by advertising, price wars and the pursuit of financial gain. New orientation of 
Chinese economy on market competition also prompted households to reckon new benefits of 
further education. Despite the fact, the state policy increased costs of education paid by 
students. 
One of the latest trends in Chinese economy is a perceptible growth of R&D spending, which 
amounted 1.39% of GDP in 2006 and 1.77% of GDP in 2010. An important role played also 
the shift of R&D activities from government agencies to enterprises. The second is the 
increasing influence of foreign firms, which gives Chinese firms the push for dynamic 
behaviour in order to beat the competition. 
As we have shown in Section I, since 1970s China has implemented a number of necessary 
economic reforms and chosen a gradual path of transition. Following sections show that these 
reforms gave Chinese economy the right push. However, a rather conservative approach of the 
Chinese government left the country with still unfinished institutional reconstruction and 
other limitations caused by its planned system legacy. 
 
3 Determining growth factors 
Three solid global players – United States, Europe and Japan – have slowly lost their 
dominance on the world market. In 2007, the developing world accounted for 49% of global 
GDP, up from 39% in 1990, and is likely to surpass the developed world within the next two 
decades (Accenture, 2007). 
According to (Accenture, 2007), we can see the world today has been divided into multiple 
centres of economic power and activity because of three mutually-reinforcing trends: 
First of all, due to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) support, which China accessed in 
2001, governments successfully implemented policies to increase economic openness and trade 
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Secondly, as advanced technologies allowed faster communication and information gained 
increasing power, businesses were able to disaggregate their functions and activities 
geographically. As a result, not only brought such actions wide range of service activities but 
many were located in developing countries. 
Thirdly, as we already mentioned above, the search for new opportunities – new markets, 
economies of scale – and new sources of capital and labour brought multinational companies 
in emerging markets. 
 
3.1 Time for liberalization 
What allowed the shifts and changes in economic development were especially waves of 
liberalization which helped to overcome protectionist barriers in developing countries. 
In case of China, such actions seem to have been inevitable. In order to become successfully 
competitive, China’s state enterprises had to change their business model. One of the changes 
came in 1997 with ownership reforms of the state-owned firms and legalization of private 
enterprises. Such epoch-making legislative measure and following reduction of legal barriers 
caused rapid growth of private enterprises in every sector of the economy. According to 
(Xiaodong, 2012), the share of total urban employment in domestic private enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises between 1998 and 2007 increased from 8 to 24%. 
However, in the pursuit of recreating themselves as capitalist companies they found their own 
way. It is fair to say that not all forms of capitalism are the same. Scholars ordinarily 
distinguish two main capitalist industrial models with different approaches – market-oriented 
neo-liberal capitalism, illustrated by the United States or Britain, and a non-neoliberal 
organization-oriented capitalism, the case of Japan and Germany. 
The main focus of Anglo-American model is the enterprise’s share-market price. The research 
of (Chan & Unger, 2009) explains that enterprises following this model mainly try to boost 
short-term profits whilst putting a stress on accountability to shareholders. They prefer to treat 
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decides regularly whether to seek the highest price for his or her skill; and management weighs 
the returns from its training costs and the risk that an employee may choose to leave. There is 
no further obligation above the labour contract. On the other hand, in Japan and Germany, 
enterprises rely more on bank-based financing; therefore, they are relatively insulated from the 
stock market's influence. That allows Japanese and German firms to focus more on long-term 
goals and reinvesting their profits, rather than distributing extensive dividends. It means that a 
firm is more inclined to provide an employee with a job security and seniority-based career in 
return of his or hers subsequent almost life-long commitment. 
These differences are caused by their different path dependency effects, their own cultural 
background and historical development. Generally speaking, each system, based on the 
existing principle, has adapted to the political and economic conditions it faced. Hence, 
applying the same logic we can distinguish China’s unique business model. 
The 1920s and 1930s during Republican era in China brought new legal framework for 
industrial relations, state-corporatist tendencies and state interventions with efforts to limit a 
high labour turnover rate among skilled workers. In short, these were the preconditions for the 
danwei (socialist or the Maoist work unit) system (Chan & Unger, 2009). 
1950s were marked by the power of Communist Party and nationalization of factories. At 
first, the obvious solution was to implement a Soviet-style wage system based on skills and 
output quotas. Nevertheless, under the influence of, inter alia, their cultural legacy, especially 
their traditional mark – Chinese respect for elders, and deeply held Maoist beliefs, they soon 
inclined to a work-year seniority system. The Chinese socialist danwei became something more 
than the usual workplace. It stood for a community which provided for everyday needs of the 
whole employees’ families, jobs for their children etc. Alongside with no work mobility, in-
house training and life-time employment security the danwei system shows a good 
resemblance to the Japanese system then. The Maoist industrial system had a centrally 
planned, authoritarian, nationalistic and collectivistic economy. 
In the post-World War II times, Japan and China took different paths. In Japan, the collective 
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other hand, was taken over by Mao’s personality cult and the will of the Communist Party-
state. Danwei’s functions were affected by political control followed by purges and the need of 
meeting the targets set by Communist Party-state and relevant bureaus. 
Extensive changes came after Mao’s death, with economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the 
1980s. These allowed firms to keep a great deal of their profits and enable management to a 
greater extent to decide how to spend the funds. After countless years of loyal service and what 
some may call self-denial, many thought that it is the right time for retribution and sharing of 
the new-found profits. A widespread phenomenon occurred in the 1980s – state-oriented 
enterprises started to evolve into organisation-oriented as employees’ loyalties and business 
strategies focused on the welfare of the organization’s community. A study of (Xie & Wu, 
2008) observes, "it became the common expectation that managers would secure the retained 
funds and use them to upgrade workers' living standards. The better they fulfilled the 
expectation, the more legitimacy and popularity they would gain as danwei leaders". 
The common practice in the Anglo-American system today is that the remuneration for work 
(across different companies in the same industry) is determined by the labour market, 
depending on his or hers skills. In China, on the other hand, workers employed in a more 
profitable danwei can earn up to 2.5 times more than those (otherwise comparable) employed 
in an unprofitable one (Xie & Wu, 2008). 
The research of (Chan & Unger, 2009) also mentioned that the overall evidence of the 
prevailing business model is mixed. Under the influence of self-enrichment tendencies, there is 
also a strong pull in favour of the Anglo-American model of capitalism. However, the history 
implanted in many Chinese minds the idea of an ‘enterprise family’ (as Japanese call it) and 
important sense of loyalty. So, as long as the economy is growing, it may seem very probable 
that their specific organization-model will survive. 
Until today, the biggest profitable enterprises remain under direct public ownership and in 
line with the central government policy. In 2007 state-owned or majority-controlled industrial 
firms accounted for only 20,680. According to (Chan & Unger, 2009), 10,074 of these 
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smaller enterprises have been privatized, even though, a part of these have preserved similar 
characteristics, such as management style, labour relations and employee benefits, to the state-
owned. 
Nonetheless, gains from liberalizing changes and China’s transition period have been already 
depleted. It seems that, as (Holz, 2005) study puts it, the economic transition could not been 
the sole cause of China’s economic growth as China’s economy have not stopped growing nor 
slowing down since. 
 
3.2 Attracting the world 
The dawn of 21th century proved China to be the world’s largest emerging economy. 
Naturally, that could not escape the attention of any multinational corporation, and it did not. 
The paper (Jiatao & Jing, 2003) cites: “In 2000, more than $40 billion was invested in China 
from companies around the world, and a further $62 billion was committed as contractual 
FDI, investment pledged for future projects”. These have further accelerated in following years 
as China entered the WTO, also became a major production centre for many multinational 
corporations. Figure 1 displays precisely the amount of direct investment flows. As we can 
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Figure 1: Direct investment inward - China 
We have looked into the most recent analysis from 2007, which looked into the structure of 
foreign firms on the Chinese market. These data show that most of the foreign firms were 
involved in electronic products, textiles, clothes and shoes. Speaking in relative terms, FDI was 
substantial in computers, office machines, furniture, footwear, sport goods, where more than 
two thirds of the value added came from foreign-owned firms (Lundin, et al., 2007). The same 
study confirms that the foreign share of R&D expenditures was generally lower than the shares 
of other economic indicators. (Lundin, et al., 2007) research also states the following findings: 
the foreign share of R&D expenditures accounted for 50% or above in only three sectors – 
musical instruments and sport goods; leather and footwear; furniture. 
Undeniably, China is one of the world’s biggest recipients of foreign direct investment. For 
example, the number of foreign-owned firms increased by 150%, and in terms of absolute 
values, from 3,489 in 1998 to 8,745 in 2004 (Lundin, et al., 2007). The same report 
mentions a prevailing concern that FDI does not support indigenous technology development 
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for 21% in 1998 and in 2004 increased only to 29%. (Lundin, et al., 2007) conclude that the 
effect of FDI on R&D can be indirect as the domestic firms pick up new experience and skills, 
and new competitive pressure on the market occurs; all because of an influx of foreign 
investors. 
The faster spread of new information technologies led to an internationalization of industrial 
R&D, in other words multinational corporations were able to organize research activities more 
efficiently. In 1996-2000, more than 100 foreign R&D centres have been established in China 
(People's Daily, 2000). Such behaviour was partly a reflection of Chinese policy makers. They 
believed in technology’s contribution to economic growth, and partly a demonstration of 
foreign firms’ long-term commitment to China – one of the most important markets in the 
making. 
By using international R&D alliances, firms can take advantage of the allied country and its 
scientific inputs. Multinationals can also modify their products or services to meet the local 
needs, achieve economies of scale and monitor their local competitors. One of many examples 
– Microsoft set up its research facility in Beijing in 1998 with a guarantee of 80 million 
dollars, the second outside the United States then (2003). 
Figure 2 shows the development of the indigenous expenditures on R&D in China, Japan, 
South Korea and USA since 1995 till 2010. We might argue that developed economies, such 
as USA (with 2.73% of GDP) or geographically closer Japan (with 3.26% of GDP), are still 
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Figure 2: Total expenditure on R&D - comparison 
The question is why China should attract a special attention. First, since 1990s the global 
trend is to extend the investment focus from already traditional manufacturing to the 
knowledge-based services. By locating new R&D in China, the multinational corporations are 
able to adapt their products or services to the needs of the local market correspondingly. Let us 
also remind that Chinese population accounts for over 1.3 billion people. That is a 
considerable market indeed. 
Second motivation for multinational corporations to conduct R&D activities in China is the 
overall fact that science and technology work here have been growing rapidly. Figure 3 
depicts the rising interest of China in the R&D area. As we can see, in 2010 China has spent 
over $100 billion on research and development, amounting 1.77% of total GDP. Since 2007, 
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Figure 3: Total expanditure on R&D - China 
Chinese investment interest lays especially in pharmaceuticals, machinery, transport 
equipment, electronics, computers and office machinery; but there is, again, a big difference 
between domestic and foreign firms. Foreign R&D intensity is higher than domestic in only 
three sectors: non-metallic mineral products, ferrous metals, and non-ferrous metals (Lundin, 
et al., 2007). 
The third reason for foreign investors to pay attention is that China offers one of the most 
abundant sources of human capital. The Chinese government estimates that over 2500 PhDs, 
20 000 individuals with master's degrees, and 3000 other students have come back to China 
after finishing their studies abroad (Jiatao & Jing, 2003). Multinationals can be motivated to 
expand R&D activities in China because of the fairly low cost of China's skilled labour force. 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2006) study argues that “local companies hire these people at salaries 
much lower than those that engineers in developed markets earn, since institutional voids 
pervade the talent market in India. However, it is very difficult for foreign companies to 
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Fourth, China has shown an encouraging attitude towards foreign R&D establishments and 
enacted several preferential policies, such as duty free import of certain equipment, lower 
overall costs in comparison to the establishments in the USA. Since R&D centres established 
in China, by foreign and local partners or only by foreign partners, tend to cooperate 
extensively with Chinese universities and institutes, they also provide employment for many 
skilled Chinese researchers and serve as an additional source of R&D financing. 
R&D alliances in China are distributed in three regions – metropolitan cities of Beijing and 
Shanghai, special economic zones and coastal cities, and the rest of the country. According to 
(Jiatao & Jing, 2003), most of the foreign R&D investors came from North America, followed 
by European multinational corporations and investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. 
Earlier studies, (Voelker & Stead, 1999) and (Ronstadt, 1977), showed that initially research 
was undertaken at the home country, whilst development facilities were established abroad 
when foreign markets became sufficiently large. These were at first supposed to help to adapt 
their products or services to local market conditions. However, lately the trend has changed. 
The international R&D facilities do not serve as a source of cost savings but more as an 
opportunity to gain access to new technologies or local knowledge, and within the 
multinational corporations network are together creating an integrated whole. 
 
3.3 How to compete? 
A problem, which arose afterwards, was how to compete on the market already taken over by 
well-known and established brands with effective management systems, innovation processes 
and in comparison easier access to capital, both physical and human, and which benefits from 
better setting of the whole institutional framework. 
(Khanna, et al., 2005) study, which is further analysed in (Khanna & Palepu, 2006), states 
that this problem can be overcome because of three reasons. First, the firms from developed 
countries “must confront the same institutional voids that local companies face” and have to 
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environment (Khanna, et al., 2005). Such companies simply tend to implement their 
standardized strategies with a little bit of local twist. Nonetheless, locals already possess the 
knowledge, how to identify with customers and meet their specific needs and preferences 
effectively. They also know how to work around local regulatory systems, contract-enforcing 
mechanisms and infrastructure – which are mostly missing or underdeveloped. 
Knowing that, many firms with multinational desires now rather carefully think through pros 
and cons of such global expansions. According to (Khanna & Palepu, 2006) analysis, 
American corporations invest rather in developed countries because they are aware of these 
difficulties and perform better in developed markets.3 However, the solution is not to look 
away but to adjust strategies to the unique features of the institutional context. 
Several transnational corporations founded in emerging markets have even successfully entered 
North America and Europe with their low-cost oriented strategies and new business models 
(e.g. China's Haier Group in household electrical appliances, India's Infosys in information 
technology services). Resulting, as the emerging markets have accustomed to the new order 
and looked for convenient niches and opportunities on the market, they grew stronger, and 
some managed to fight for their places on the global market extremely well. 
 
3.4 Resources in human capital 
The fact is that companies from many developing countries cannot access human capital as 
easily as those from Western Europe or America, mainly because of underdeveloped 
infrastructure. Hence, they often have troubles to invest in R&D or to go global. 
However, China has successfully managed to implement the advanced technology and with 
taking advantage of well accessible cheap labour they quickly reached the world. Many 
3 (Khanna, et al., 2005) study states the following: „By the end of 2002 - according to the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce-American corporations and their affiliate companies 
had $1.6 trillion worth of assets in the United Kingdom and $514 billion in Canada but only $173 billion in 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China combined. That's just 2.5% of the $6.9 trillion in investments American 
companies held by the end of that year. In fact, although U.S. corporations' investments in China doubled 
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developed countries moved their production to China to lower their costs of production. Such 
actions, as a result, brought the needed capital for locals, which they conveniently invested in 
R&D, innovation and education. The development of China’s investments in R&D we have 
shown in the previous section. Let us in greater detail look into another growth factor – 
human capital. 
According to (The Economist, 2010), China produces 75,000 people with higher degrees in 
engineering or computer science every year. Figure 4 depicts the results of executive survey of 
International Institute for Management Development published in World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 2012. It is clear that China still lags behind its western competitor, the USA. 
Nonetheless, China is undeniably on the rise.  
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(Science and Engineering Indicators, 2012) report supports this allegation by following 
findings: 
• From 2000 through 2008, the ‘number of S&E first university degrees awarded in 
China and Taiwan more than doubled’. 
• ‘In 2007, China overtook the United States as the world leader in the number of 
doctoral degrees awarded in the natural sciences and engineering.’ 
• In China and Japan more than half of bachelor degrees were awarded in S&E fields in 
2008. For a comparison, S&E degrees accounted for around one-third of all first 
degrees awarded in the United States. 
• In China, about 31% of all bachelor degrees awarded in the same year were in 
engineering. In the United States, they accounted for just about 4%. 
• Almost two thirds of the foreign S&E graduates in the United States in November 
2010 came from India and China. 
• Nearly 40,000 undergraduates from China enrolled in a U.S. institution in 2009-
2010. 
Nonetheless, China founds itself in a substantial demographic transition and has to cope with 
it within a short period. The causes of such profound changes are – strict one-child policy, 
fast economic growth and essential social transformation. During the reform period, China’s 
demography experienced a steep drop in fertility. China enjoyed a sufficient labour supply at 
first, due to productive population structure (Cai & Wang, 2012). In the following years, 
though, the growth of the working-age population became slowing and population ageing 
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Figure 5: Demographic transition - China case 
According to a prediction (United Nations, 2009), “the year 2015 will be China’s turning 
point when the population aged 15 to 64 will stop increasing and begin shrinking.”4 The 
official report China's Total Population and Structural Changes in 2011 released by National 
Bureau of Statistics of China states following: “At the end of 2011, the national population in 
the age group of 60 and over accounted for 184.99 million persons, occupied 13.7% of the 
total, rose by 0.47 percentage points over the end of the 2010. The national population in the 
age group of 65 and over accounted for 122.88 million persons, occupied 9.1% of the total, 
increased by 0.25 percentage points. The proportion of the population in working-age at 15-
64 firstly fell down since 2002, which occupied 74.4% in 2011, slightly dropped 0.10 
percentage points over the previous year, due to the continued low level of fertility and the 
accelerated process of population aging. Although there will be slight fluctuations in the next 
few years, the labour supply issues need to pay more attention.” 
That is a good point. With the emergence of labour shortages in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, wages have been forced to grow rapidly in both sectors (Wang, 2010). 
4 Even if we take into account the impacts of rural-to-urban migration, according to (Cai & Wang, 2012) “by 
2015 the incremental working age population in urban areas will be less than that of the reduced working-age 
population in rural areas, and the total working-age population will begin to shrink. This implies that, without 
substantial enhancement of wages and other incentives, migrant workers will not fill the gap vacated by rapid 
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Such actions brought along intensive labour disputes, especially after issuing or updating 
several Chinese labour laws in 2008. 
 
3.5 Abandoning a dual-sector model 
In a dual economy, we distinguish two separate economic sectors divided by different levels of 
development and technology. Julius Herman Boeke originally created the concept to describe 
a colonial economy. The dual concept was further developed by Sir Arthur Lewis to support 
his labour supply theory of rural-urban migration in less developed countries. 
The assumption of the model says that a developing economy has an excess of unproductive 
labour in the agricultural sector, characterized by low (substantial) wages and low 
productivity. Since the substantial (agricultural) sector faces the conditions of fixed input – 
limited land to cultivate – the marginal product of additional worker is zero, due to the law of 
diminishing marginal returns). These workers are transferred to the growing manufacturing 
sector (private or public), controlled by the capitalist, who offer higher wages. This period, 
whilst the gap between marginal productivity of labour between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors prevails, can be interpreted as the Lewis Turning Point (Lewis, 1972; 
Ranis & Fei, 1961; Cai & Wang, 2012). Capitalists’ profit over time allows them to invest in 
the capital stock. Eventually, the modern industrial sector promotes industrialization and 
stimulates development. However, as the marginal productivity of workers increases because 
of capital formation and decreases by additional workers attracted to work in the non-
agricultural sector, the wage rates in both sectors will equilibrate. In the end of this process, 
the agricultural wage equals the manufacturing wage, as well as the agricultural and 
manufacturing marginal product of labour. 
(Cai & Wang, 2012) study implies that China is facing its Lewis Turning point, and base it 
on the facts of unskilled labour shortages and wage increases. They also mention that such 
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The Kuznets Curve predicts a determined path of inequality within a country. Classic 
Kuznets Curve has a form of an inverted U-Curve depicting the relationship between 
inequality and income per capita, originally observed as a cross sectional relationship over 
numerous countries, shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Kuznets Curve - cross sectional study 
We analysed data from 1980 through 2012 to find evidence which supports the above 
mentioned theory (see Figure 7). It seems China may be following this path. In the 1980, 
China’s Gini coefficient impended around 0.23. After years of industrialization and rapid 
growth China exhibited a Gini coefficient of 0.491 in 2008, and decreasing since. In 2012, it 
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Figure 7: Kuznets Curve - China case 
Nonetheless, the setup of income distribution cannot be modified spontaneously. Workers 
gain more bargaining power as they have more job opportunities and a stronger voice in 
labour disputes. The theory of Lewis Turning Point explains it as a simple result of labour 
market changes. Such changes clearly display a demand for labour market institutions able to 
preserve social cohesion. 
 
3.6 Challenging task for the government 
Facing the ageing population and growing voice of Chinese labour force throughout the 
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impacts caused by structural and demographic changes, and thus secure sustainable economic 
development. 
The Chinese government has undertaken necessary steps to build a social security system. In 
the 12th Five-Year Plan approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2011, the 
expenses for urban pensions and health care were established as compulsory objectives for the 
next five years. However, the creation of labour market institutions has not been specifically 
scheduled in the plan. 
In February 2013, China’s State Council also revealed guidelines to reform the income 
distribution mechanism which focus on increasing residents’ income, regulate the distribution 
and narrowing the income distribution disparity. 
According to these guidelines, the state owned enterprises will be required to pay higher taxes 
and dividends to individual shareholders in the future. These additional funds might be used 
to fund social security, health care or education. On the agenda was also the topic of interest 
rate liberalisation; regulated interest rates brought not only cheap credit to state owned 
enterprises, but reduced yields of household savers as well. The guidelines remember that local 
governments should be supported by sustainable revenue source in terms of their fiscal 
expenditure obligations. Their existing revenue system is dominated by land sales. The new 
proposition is to link the system to more profitable imposition of property taxes. Finally, as 
China’s hukou residency system impeded the poor from country to move to urban areas, the 
government promise to help rural migrant workers to register as urban residents. 
An article (Laurenceson, 2013), of a senior lecturer at School of Economics at University of 
Queensland, mentions another motivating factor for releasing these guidelines, besides social 
stability. Faster ‘income growth at the lower end of the income distribution’ may help to 
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3.7 Financial sector 
Other factors, which helped China to sustained economic growth, are undeniably financial 
sector reforms and development. A remarkable growth of China’s GDP is depicted in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Total PPP Converted GDP 
The relevant change can be traced to the 1980s, when the growth was pulled by increasing 
domestic consumption, which accounted for 70% of total GDP. In 1990s, consumption 
started to weaken and investment took over. Private consumption decreased from 49% of 
GDP in 1990 to 35% in 2008. On the other hand, investment increased from 35% to 44% 
of GDP in the same period. The rise regarded foreign investment and domestic capital 
investments as well (The Economist, 2009; Zhang, 2008). 
Figure 9 clearly describes the growth rate development throughout decades since 1950s. At 
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The first one coincides with the period of the Great Leap Forward and the second one with 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
 
Figure 9: GDP PPP growth rate 
The Great Leap Forward policy, a forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization, 
was carried in the spirit of well-known slogan ‘overtake the British, race the Americans’. The 
primary goal was to increase Chinese production, get China into position of a world power 
and establish communism. Nonetheless, both political and economic mismanagement and 
low agricultural production led to extensive famine caused, as demographers officially agree, 
estimated 25–30 million deaths and vast economic regression. It is not surprising that Mao 
Zedong’s unsuccessful and expensive campaign faced strict criticism within the communist 
party. In response, he initiated another campaign – the Cultural Revolution, officially taking 
place in 1966–1969. 
The Cultural Revolution was a social-political movement initiated by Mao Zedong, then 
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military leader, Lin Biao in 1971. His motivation was to return to his position of power after 
failing with his former policy of the Great Leap Forward, appease his opponents – particularly 
Liu Shaoqi a Deng Xiaoping, and enforce communism by removing capitalist (among others) 
elements from Chinese society. 
Mao’s movement, though, halted economic activity for quite a while. Vast expenses went on 
numbers of Red Guards, the railway system was disordered and countless pieces of cultural 
heritage and fine arts were destroyed. Years of the Cultural Revolution took a toll on the 
education system as well. Intellectuals were persecuted, sent to rural labour camps or left 
China. What has been China left with was a generation of inadequately educated people. 
After Mao’s death in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four, members of radical communist 
faction, China has under reforms of Deng Xiaoping and other reformers begun to open to the 
Western civilizations. Crucial reforms regarded a financial sector as well – commercial 
banking replaced the old ‘monobank’ system, new regulatory bodies were established, and 
stock markets emerged (Burzynska, 2009). 
Stock market were established in 1990, one in Shanghai, another in Shenzen. Most of the 
trading took place in Shanghai, old financial centre of China, the rest in Shenzen, a fast 
growing city in South. The Chinese securities market is composited of tradable and non-
tradable shares, and differentiate three classes of shares outstanding: shares traded by domestic 
investors (A-shares), shares denominated in foreign currencies and set aside for foreign 
investors (B-shares), and shares of companies listed or cross-listed overseas (H-shares in Hong 
Kong) (Beltratti & Bortolotti, 2006; Campello, et al., 2010). The non-tradable shares were 
originally created to ensure that state-owned enterprises would not be acquired by private or 
foreign entities and were issued to the founders of a corporation, business partners or 
employees. Such suppression of capital reduced supply and pushed up the price of tradable 
shares. In 2006, as we can see in Figure 10, non-tradable shares accounted for 55% of total 
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Figure 10: Outstanding Shares 
However, the dominance of non-tradable shares soon proved to be causing problems. 
Tradable shares holders were usually minority shareholders with a limited power and limited 
free float on the domestic market led to volatility and insufficient liquidity, hence making the 
market prone to manipulation and insider trading. The inefficiency of the domestic market 
compelled many Chinese businesses to list overseas, most preferably in Hong Kong. 
After few attempts to deal with this problem, in 2005 Chinese government initiated two pilot 
programs, inviting 4 at first and later 42 companies to transform non-tradable shares to 
tradable. Shareholders were compensated through bonus shares, cash, options and others. 
Chinese government further encouraged other companies to participate in the reform share 
project. In 2006, as a result, 769 listed companies had finished or at least started to turn non-
tradable into tradable shares (Beltratti & Bortolotti, 2006). At the end of 2007, the 
capitalisation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges stood as 133% of GDP. 
However, the tradable market capitalisation accounted for only 37% of GDP. 
After these changes, further development of financial markets followed instantly. Financial 
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According to (Yao & Wu, 2011), in 2009, ‘there were about 5,600 banking institutions, 4 
asset management companies, 107 security companies, 100 security investment consultation 
agencies, 60 kinds of fund management companies and 162 future companies.’ 
Chinese banking system is highly regulated sector, and is not directly linked to other 
international financial markets as other open economies are. Powerful government control 
over the financial system has managed to tackle successfully the last financial crisis (2008 
Global Financial Crisis), nonetheless, at the cost of suspended market liberalization. A famous 
Chinese financial constraint emphasizes that there is a significant delay between actions of the 
financial system and economic growth. Financial products are often blocked in the system 
and cannot support the real economy. On the other hand, one must admit that Chinese 
commercial banks (still state-owned) are considered as the world’s most profitable.  
Moreover, China has preserved outstanding economic growth even during the post-financial 
crisis period. The economy has been seriously hit by a drop in exports, due to the negative 
shock of international demand. GDP growth, though, remained over 6%. Such performance 
would not be possible without Chinese government’s decision to stimulate domestic demand 
by 4 trillion RMB investments and to relax the restrictions on bank loans (Yao & Wu, 2011). 
It may seem that China has successfully settled not only the global financial crisis in 2008, but 
one can get the same impression from Asian crisis in 1997. On the other hand, these costly 
measures and already mentioned discrepancy between the financial sector and the real 
economy are making the economy even more fragile. This approach is not sustainable cannot 
be repeated over and over. China should, therefore, continue the path of market liberalization 
and develop a flexible financial market. That might be the only way how to become world´s 
major player. 
 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
If we take into account the past GDP growth rates and the GDP PPP progression (see Figures 
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purchasing power terms until 2015. In terms of per capita, the crossing point lays further in 
the future, twenty to thirty years from now. However, faster developing coastal areas may 
catch up a decade earlier. 
These predictions are based on two relevant considerations. First, the development and 
reforms of China’s economy, described above, fits the standard development pattern and 
trade theories. Providing that, this booming ‘miracle’ still has many years of economic growth 
to come. Secondly, as we have shown earlier, China’s education in science and engineering is 
experiencing remarkable rise as well. If we assume that talent is randomly distributed in the 
world population and omit some unexpected events (e.g. natural disasters, wars), an 
increasing amount of high-skilled labourers will certainly support China’s economic growth. 
Furthermore, the increasing amount of able workers might have a positive impact on rising 
competition and further innovation. 
Despite all the positive forecasts, it is necessary to continue reforming the financial sector. 
China recognised the role of healthy financial system. Therefore, it is vital to further remove 
market imperfections – develop better credit allocation and improve access to financing 
private enterprises and SMEs (Holz, 2005). 
 
4 Quantitative Analysis 
In the previous section, we tried to describe carefully the key drivers of rapid upswing of the 
Chinese economy in the recent decades. We have also strived to build up a theoretical concept 
of particular growth factors which stand behind this economical outburst. Moreover, we 
would like to dedicate following part to support previous résumés and theoretical concepts 
by quantitative data analysis.  
In the area of Chinese growth, there have been made profound research before. We may 
mention (Yingyi, 2000) for the institutional, (Lin, et al., 2003) for comparative-advantage, 
(Young, 2003) and (Yanrui, 2004) for aggregate production based, dangerous (Gertz, 2000) 
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macroeconomic estimations investigating GDP growth, using quite sophisticated econometric 
techniques far behind the scope of this work. 
Therefore, we have decided to concentrate on the variables which have not been widely used 
yet. We suppose that there may have been other factors aside from mainstream 
macroeconomics and financial markets theory, and which could have had a significant impact 
on the economic growth of a particular country. 
As it is quite common, such effort cannot be successfully defended without empirical evidence 
– which is strictly connected to data availability. We have managed to obtain an access to one 
of the world most thorough and comprehensive annual report on the country competitiveness 
published since 1989 (without interruption). 
On the following pages, we would like to take advantage of such opportunity and perform 
quantitative econometric analysis of the findings presented in the previous section. Our main 
effort is to find and determine the most significant variables influencing the GDP growth. 
Table 1 and Table 2 depict China’s GDP and GDP per capita as a percentage of GDP of 
other large nations. Such a striking economic performance served us as a motivation for 
further research. 
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Table 2: China's per capita GDP as a percent of figures for other nations 
 
4.1 Data 
The fundamental source of data is World Competitiveness Yearbook Online (WCY), 
which analyse and rank the qualities of particular countries, in terms of competitiveness. This 
comparison extensively covers 59 countries within 300 criteria from business, international, 
institutional or academics area. 
As a secondary source we used the reputable and often updated database – Penn World 
Table (PWT) – which is the largest freely available database of basic macroeconomic data, 
covering 30 national account variables for 167 countries in the time period from 1950 to 
2000. The majority of variables is purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted. Hence, extracted 
dataset makes possible long-term comparison of the time series data for selected countries. 
Finally, we have obtained basic dataset of 100 variables5 for 19 countries from 1995 through 
2011, which is a truly exceptional source for creating a strongly balanced panel data dataset. 
 
4.1.1 Modelling procedure 
In this paper we would like to examine Chinese economy in two steps. Firstly, we want to 
build up an overall model and try to estimate GDP growth using different variables from 
areas mentioned in the Section 3. Secondly, we wish to analyse particular significant drivers 
of growth and find their estimates, using other independent variables. 
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To pursue this promoted course of our work, we would like to use various econometric 
techniques, regarding the character of the dataset, based on the analysis of panel data 
including pooled OLS regression, Fixed and Random Effects modelling, instrumental variable 
approach and 2SLS estimator. 
The sample selection was fully submitted to the topic of our interest – the key drivers of GDP 
growth. Therefore, we have chosen to analyse the most developed countries in the world - the 
members of the G-20 major economies6. To present them in the alphabetical order: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China Mainland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and USA. 
From all the observations available for time period 1995-2011 the countries have been 
arranged into the classic panel data pattern. Subsequent estimation was performed using 
STATA: Data Analysis and Statistic Software. 
 
4.1.2 Limitations 
First two fundamental limitations come directly from the data selection and its form. 
Nevertheless, we do not consider taking observations from a limited group of countries (G-
20) as a violation of the Random sampling assumption. In our case, there is a particular 
reason for restricting the dataset because the chosen variables are determining only for the 
developed countries. Moreover, after exploring the data, the differences between individual 
countries are still considerable. 
The more complicated issue was the substantial number of missing values. In this particular 
case, the situation was more disturbing and, as a result, we were forced to remove the whole 
Saudi Arabia section and several more variables from the dataset. 
The STATA software automatically treats the data using list-wise edition (deleting/omitting 
affected observations from regression). Even though, this is the simplest solution of missing 
values issue, it also substantially decreases the sample size. Nonetheless, under the assumption 
that the missing values are Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) the estimates stay 
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unbiased. Taking into consideration, that there is no numerical relationship between the 
variables and missing values are emerging without any pattern, we assume that this MCAR 
assumption holds. (The violation towards Missing Not At Random (MNAR) would still 
produce almost unbiased estimates. Thereby, we simply decided to delete all obviously non-
performing variables and then consider this problem of second-rate importance further on.) 
We also tried to use other and more rigorous approaches to the issue of missing values. The 
mean substitution seems to be inappropriate for Fixed Effect approach – even though it helps 
to increase the sample size, it also produces bias. Neither second - Multiple Imputation 
treatment - was working, as it sometimes produced unreal values (e.g. negative Urbanization). 
Hence, we checked for the probability of having MCAR values, and solved the problem as 
written above. Without omitted observations, FE estimator basically produces the same result 
as if it would deal with only balanced panel, not strongly balanced one. 
 
4.2 Empirical evidence 
As we have already mentioned, our first intention was to estimate overall model which 
would describe the GDP growth rate and which we regress on different sets of chosen 
independent variables from Section 3.  
With respect to the properties of our dataset, we have decided to take advantage of using 
panel data estimation methods to find the significant factors influencing GDP growth. With 
such numerous possibilities for regression candidates, the estimating procedure has turned 
demanding and time consuming.  
We have performed plenty of regressions with an intention to identify the significant variables 
and join them together to create models with both statistical and economic significance and 
reasoning. With this concept in mind, we developed 5 models. The final choice of variables 
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4.2.1 Methodology 
Each model had been originally estimated with more variables. Some of them were then 
diagnosed as not significant and, therefore, dropped out of the model. Moreover, in 
accordance with classic panel data analysis we have developed both Fixed and Random Effects 
estimator and consequently controlled for the consistency of Random Effects (RE). As 
reported in Table 5, it is clear that the key assumption for RE to be consistent 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝜗𝑖) = 0 is obviously violated in all the 5 models. The null hypothesis of consistent 
RE can be strongly rejected on the 1% level of significance in all cases (p-value is always lower 
than 0.01).  
Random Effect estimator produces inconsistent estimates and, therefore, Fixed Effects (FE) 
should be preferred. The FE estimates are unbiased and consistent even if they are no longer 
fully efficient. Moreover, since there are no time invariant variables in our dataset, using the 
RE has no further justification. Last but not least, it is crucial to be aware of Hausman test 
assumptions; if they do not hold, the whole inference could be wrong (though, for our p-
values it is not very probable). Nevertheless, we had to check up for the verification of classical 
assumptions.  
We used modified Wald test for the presence of group-wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect 
regression model (xttest3 stata command (Baum, 2000)). As one can see in Table 5, null 
hypothesis of no group-wise heteroskedasticity can be strongly rejected in all five models. 
Heteroskedasticity itself cannot cause any bias of the regression coefficients. On the other 
hand, it affects the size of standard errors and consequently the inference of particular 
variables and model efficiency.  
To test the presence of autocorrelation we used Wooldridge test for panel data (stata 
command xtserial (Roodman, 2004)), and found no evidence in models (1) and (2). 
However, strong first order autocorrelation is present in models (3), (4) and (5). 
To achieve correct inference about the significance of particular variables, we corrected 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Models (1) and (2) were adjusted 
by robust standard errors, models (3), (4) and (5) needed to produce statistics robust to both 
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is to use another estimation method (stata command xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005)). This 
method is primarily designed for instrumental variable estimation but is also able to control 
FE estimation for violation of this assumption; and produces Heteroskedasticity and 
Autororelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors. 
After treating data for violation of assumptions, we checked if the results of Hausman test are 
plausible even in this scenario. xtoverid stata command (Schaffer & Stillman, 2006) 
performs a test for overidentifying restrictions. FE versus RE dilemma can be seen even from 
this perspective. FE estimator is defined by the orthogonality conditions that the regressors are 
not correlated with the idiosyncratic error 𝑒𝑖𝑡: 𝐸(X𝑖𝑡 .  e𝑖𝑡) = 0. On the other hand, RE 
estimator uses the additional orthogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated 
with the group-specific error 𝑢𝑖: 𝐸(X𝑖𝑡 .  u𝑖) = 0.7 Basically, this additional condition is 
responsible for higher efficiency of RE estimator, but only if it is satisfied. The null hypothesis 
states that the additional condition is valid. In our data (as Table 5 reports) we can strongly 
reject the null. Therefore, reported Sargan-Hansen statistic confirms previous Hausman 
suggestion to prefer FE estimator. 
This methodology we apply on all following models, thereby, we will not further report on 
the assumption testing, just submit its results (except of the instrumental variable approach 
which will be used later on). 
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4.2.2 Overall model 
In the following part, we would like to present the interpretation of regression coefficients for 
each particular model. For the overall model each interpretation will be followed by data 
restriction to “China only” and subsequent regression results effective only for Chinese 
economy. 
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MODEL (1):  
Variables significant for China: Prod_rg (0.71), Business ease (0,31) 
All the regressors are significant and interpretation of the coefficients is clear. An increase in 
labour force by one percentage point is expected to raise GDP growth by 0.5 percentage point 
(pp) while one percentage point rise in real growth of productivity is expected to raise GDP 
growth by more than 0.8 percentage point (pp).  
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Similarly, an upsurge in ease of doing business and government debt-on-GDP ratio increase 
expected GDP growth by a quarter of pp.  
In the last decade, overall productivity of Chinese workers is rising on average (as depicted in 
the trend line of Figure 11). On the other hand, US productivity growth has been 
stagnating, thus proving productivity to play a key role in closing the gap between Chinese 
economy and the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 11: Overall productivity - real growth 
MODEL (2):  
Variables significant for China: Prod_rg (0.79), Adapt (0.63), ESS (-0.15) 
Productivity real growth and Government similarly debt-on-GDP rate coefficients are quite 
similar to those from the model (1), but still a bit lower. The adaptability of companies to 
market changes has proved to be a significant and strong predictor of GDP growth. One pp 
change is expected to influence it by 0.6 pp.  
Surprisingly, in the relevant period, the pp increase in the share of Sector of Services on GDP 
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Figure 11 depicts the development of adaptability index in the last ten years. Adaptability 
index represents how the companies are able to adjust to market changes. As one can see, USA 
still surpass China, however, the gap is significantly closing from both sides. 
 
Figure 12: Adaptability of companies 
MODEL (3):  
Variables significant for China: Prod_rg (1.00), U_r (-0.37), EI (-0.51) 
In the third model, the index of knowledge transfer (between highly developed companies 
and universities) has been shown as a key driver for GDP growth, the proportion of reciprocal 
change is almost equal to one. Not surprisingly, the unemployment growth has been shown as 
a negative factor for economy growth. 
The regression coefficient suggests that the more people are employed in the industry, the 
higher growth in the economy is expected. The data for China, depicted in Figure 13, show 
a long-term increase of employment in industrial sector. After restricting data to China-only 
the coefficient has a negative value of -0.51, therefore, the tendency of industrial employment 
seems to be contradictory. These empirical findings might support the theory of passing the 
top of the Kuznets curve (mentioned in Section 3). Chinese economy was heavily 
industrialized for many decades. However, industrial sector may have been saturated, which 
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Figure 13: Employment by sector / Industry 
MODEL (4):  
Variables significant for China: Prod_rg (0.99), Exp_rnd_r (-0.59) 
This model showed, except from already mentioned productivity growth, a strong impact of 
fund availability for technological development (+0.8pp by 1pp increase). Simultaneously, it 
reported a totally unexpected 2pp decrease in GDP growth corresponding to the 1pp increase 
of expenditures share on R&D. This effect is unexpected as well, hence, we are going to cover 
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Figure 14: Total expenditure on R&D (%) 
D (%) 
MODEL (5):  
Variables significant for China: EA (-0.55) – marginally significant 
Last model brings to discussion the variables with low but still highly significant influence on 
the performance of the economy ranging from 0.01 to 0.08. Positive effects are reported for: 
overall size of the labour force (LF), PPP productivity of this LF and also Cost-of-living index. 
On the other hand, higher share of agriculture sector on employment and higher corruption 
in a particular country have indicated negative effect on GDP growth. 
The long-term trend in China’s agriculture sector is a decline of employment. From 1995 to 
2010 the percentage of total employment fell from 52.2% to 36.7%. These empirical data 
may be an addition to supportive evidence of surpassing the peak of Kuznets curve, thus 
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4.2.3 R&D sector modelling 
In the previous section, we have found a suspicious relationship between GDP growth and 
expenditures on research and development. Therefore, we decided to build up a model which 
could help to understand this relationship.  
However, to be able to find the drivers of research and development growth, we need to use 
other variables from dataset. But as it was already mentioned in the methodology part, there is 
a need to cope with the missing values issue. There is no possibility to explain R&D 
development without having sufficient data source. We have to reduce our dataset to five year 
period between 2007 and 2011, due to missing values constraint, Nevertheless, following 
estimation results (derived by the same methodological process as described before) presented 
in Table 6 are accompanied by estimation of the same model on the original data (1995-
2011) to a) control for reliability of results; b) to be able to distinguish between possible 
long/short-run differences. The estimation method has been chosen according to the nature 
of R&D variable which is not supposed to differ from one country to another. Hence, we 
made Between Effects estimation (based on group mean data) and presented a pooled OLS 
estimator. The real values are expected to range between these two estimates but most likely 
closer to the BE estimator, which is more efficient. Log(Exp_rnd) variable was renamed for 
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MODEL R&D SECTOR (SHORT-RUN):  
A high brain drain index shows that competiveness of economy is not hindered by outflow of 
talented people. Thus, the data for 19 developed countries report that, in the short run, the 
country’s expenditure on R&D is not limited by outflow of skilled workers abroad. 
As depicted in Table 6, the internationally experienced senior managers and easy availability 
of IT skills show a negative effect. Conclusion might be that an additional increase of these 
factors has not the desirable effect on further progression of R&D expenditures in developed 
countries, as they already possess such factors profusely. However, for developing or emerging 
countries it still provides an opportunity for growth. The technological regulation, supportive 
to business development and innovation, reports the same results as INT_exp and IT_skill. 
We may conclude that the argumentation is similar. 
The data gives clear evidence that funding for technological development effects the 
expenditures on R&D in a positive way. 
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For the effect of availability of competent senior managers on the market, the causality may be 
reversed. The overall effort to continuously increase competitiveness, supported by elevating 
levels of R&D expenditures, raises a need for attracting competent people. 
Other effects are too negligible for further analysis. 
 
MODEL R&D SECTOR (LONG RUN): 
In the long run, several variables became insignificant, meaning they are relevant for effective 
policy making only in the short-term horizon. 
Only difference is in the change of brain drain effect. Despite the fact, that the economy is 
not affected by outflow of talented people in terms of becoming less competitive, it is not 
long-term efficient to increase investments on R&D, as they would vanished abroad. Total 
costs would be higher than benefits for the economy. 
 
4.2.4 Effects of education 
The interest in education sector is motivated by recent sharp increase of Chinese expenditures 
on education and consequently rising share of high-skilled labour force. Such efforts may 
result in overall competitiveness improvement as well as in progressive development of R&D 
sector.  
Therefore, we decided to focus on variables connected to education sector (for the list of used 
variables and their definitions see Appendix Table 12) and their impact on GDP growth. 
Following regression coefficients depicted in Table 7 compare short-term and long-term 
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MODEL EDUCATION SECTOR:  
The examined variables are mostly significant, though, they have little influence on the GDP 
growth. The exceptions are educational system and university education, both meeting the 
needs of a competitive economy. These two are, however, insignificant in the long run. 
Worth mentioning is the secondary enrolment ratio, which is significant and has the same 
effect in both periods. It seems that a development in secondary educational system was the 
most effective, in terms of growth rate increase. In the case of China, secondary school 
enrolment rose from 70% in 1995 to 99% in 2009, thus might have contributed to the boom 
of Chinese economy. In this context, the development of neglected secondary education was 
prior (and more effective) to university education, hence the negative coefficient in the short-
run. 
It is interesting to point out that China’s secondary school enrolment ratio in 2009 was one of 
the highest among relevant countries, leaving for example USA behind. 
 
 




  46 
4.2.5 Instrumental variable approach 
We have already reported the estimation results, discussed their interpretations and 
limitations. Before presenting the conclusion of this part, we would like to use our preceding 
findings from the overall, R&D and education model to evaluate the last one.  
Our preceding enthusiasm about having plenty of useful variables from various areas at our 
disposal has been shown as slightly misleading. Two main problems arose instantly. Some of 
the variables (indexes especially) have been constructed in a way which makes their 
interpretation complicated or quite vague. The second challenging issue is the potential 
collinearity between variables as well as the presence of endogenity. We have experienced both 
these limitations. There were coefficients difficult to interpret, or having similar meaning 
(high correlation) but with opposite signs of the regression coefficients. To deal with such 
issues, we suggest using the instrumental variable approach which is presented in the 
following part. 
We have decided to treat both previously analyzed variables as potentially suffering from 
endogenity. In Table 8, we present the initial model (1) and then we instrument firstly for 
Exp_rnd_r, and then in models (2) and (3) for Exp_edu. 
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MODEL IV APPROACH:  
The theoretic intuition behind the instrumental variable approach is to include in regression a 
strictly exogenous variable which is strongly correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor. Thanks to the instrumental approach, such variable can then influence dependent 
variable via the endogenous regressor.  
The key assumption to make this approach work is strict exogenity of instrument, high 
correlation between instrument and instrumented variable. We test if these assumptions are 
satisfied in our models (2), (3) and (4). We use xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005) command, which 
automatically performs underidentification, overidentification and exogenity tests – the results 
are presented in Table 9. 
Firstly, the underidentification test reports Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic. In all three models, 
the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Used instruments are obviously relevant (i.e. 
significantly correlated with the instrumented variable). 
Secondly, the Hansen J statistics reports the results of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification 
test. The joint null hypothesis states that the instruments are properly chosen (i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term, correlated with the instrumental variable). Table 9 shows 
that we can reject the null in models (3) and (4) but we fail to reject it in case of model (2). 
Hence, even if the first stage regression results of models (3) and (4) are outstanding in terms 
of regressor significance, we clearly cannot use High_edu_ach and GovB_R as proper 
instruments; and coefficients of models (3) and (4) are biased. 
Therefore, we can concentrate on model (2) and perform the exogenity test using dmexogxt 
(Baum & Stillman, 1999) command. This test is an analogy to Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
HAC standard errors and under the null hypothesis it tests the consistency of the OLS 
estimator applied on the same regression equation. Rejection of the null suggests that the 
endogenous regressors have significant impact on the regression results, and in such case, the 
instrumental variable approach can be justified.  
The rejection of the null is obvious in the case of all three models but only the model (2) 
fulfills all the tests requirements. It is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and 
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we managed to slightly adjust the FE estimates towards the real value and make them more 
efficient.8  
Table 9: Instrumental variable approach - testing of assumptions 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
In the previous section, we tried to determine and quantify growth factors of GDP. The 
findings were surprising. The most unexpected result was the size and the sign of expenditure 
on R&D effect, which persisted throughout different periods and estimation methods.  
The last coefficient estimation from 2SLS model suggests that in period 2007 - 2011 1pp 
increase in R&D share on GDP will cause 0.623% decrease of GDP. FE estimate suggests a 
decrease of 0.59%, overall model even 2pp decrease of real GDP growth in period 1995 - 
2011.  
The reason behind this phenomenon is that the expenditures on R&D are growing faster than 
GDP. In order to stay competitive on the global market, countries are thriving to innovate 
and more willing to invest on R&D, even at higher costs relative to their GDP. For example 
in post-2008 crises period, when GDP of many countries was stagnating the expenditures on 
R&D were still rising. 
We have also considered the hypothesis of lagged R&D effect on GDP growth. Nonetheless, 
based on our dataset lagged variables of R&D have been insignificant. The only different 
result we have obtained was by applying advanced instrumental variable models (3SLS), 
which reported long-term positive effects of expenditures on R&D. We have not included 
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these results in our analysis because the system of equations suffered from over/identification 
issues. However, this gives an opportunity for further analysis. 
Previous modelling part provided supportive evidence for confirmation of growth factors 
from Section 3. We were unable to instrument endogenous expenditures on education, even 
though its effect on GDP growth was considerably lower but still negative. On the other 
hand, we managed to demonstrate partial effects of relevant growth factors in the overall 
modelling part and highlight the unique features of China’s case. 
 
5 Conclusion 
During the 20th century, China has come from simple agricultural land trough heavy 
industrialization to current development of tertiary system. Decades of intensive reforms and 
remarkable changes have reshaped Chinese economy into a unique and still developing 
hybrid. This hybrid economy is increasingly responsive to market forces (even in international 
terms), yet it still reflects a legacy of planned system. We may call it a successful 
transformation so far as it is clear that these reforms released China’s suppressed potential and 
started a new era of ‘miraculous’ growth. Without a doubt, China has become a noticeable 
player on the global market. 
The new market attracted numerous profit-seeking investors mainly from the North America 
and Europe. The first motivation for FDI was to increase production and exports, whilst 
taking advantage of low-cost labour. That served as a trigger for expansion of R&D. Today, 
China is one of the biggest recipients of FDIs; and Chinese growing enthusiasm for 
innovation is undeniable. 
China has been dealt with a strong hand of cards – being the most populous country in the 
world it disposes of an abundant source of human capital. In Section 3, we reported 
increasing significance of education for Chinese. The rational conclusion is to set such 
educational system that would attract talent and curb brain drain. Conclusively, from such 
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Despite the booming economy, China is facing grievous imbalances among regions and 
repercussions of the ageing population. That lays a particularly challenging task for Chinese 
government and elite to carry out. Above all, these major issues have to be addressed in a very 
short period of time. 
However, this formerly developing country has undeniably earned a prominent place among 
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